













# What's the "Security" Problem? (cont.)

- Security viewed as anathema to academic institutions which *think* that they thrive in openness!
  - » Limited site security (historically)
  - » An "open site" affected only that site until network connectivity came along (e.g., CSNET, BITNET, Internet... and Internet 2?)





#### Case Study: DoD Vulnerability

- 1996 General Accounting Office report of 38,000 Defense Information System Agency "attacks" on DoD computers (1992-1995)
  - » 35% were blocked with existing configuration
  - » 62% were successful and undetected
  - » 2% were successful and detected, yet unreported
  - » 1% were successful, detected, and reported















### ADSL and Cable Modems

- High-speed "home" access opens up millions to additional security problems
  - » ADSL & cable modems provide dedicated access to homes that generally don't have firewalls
  - » Both assign fixed IP addresses to hosts
  - » Cable modems share bandwidth amongst users



- IETF Site Security Handbook (RFC 2196):
  - » Security policies (what, why, how)
  - » Security architecture (network and services topologies, firewalls)
  - » Security procedures (authentication, authorization, access, modems, cryptography, auditing, backup)
  - » Security incident handling (preparation before, handling an event, aftermath)
- This plan must evolve with the organization

## Local Security Policies

- Local appropriate use and security policies are needed
  - » to spell out legitimate system/network use
  - » for user's and site's legal protection
  - » to help users play their part in running a secure operation, detecting and reporting problems
- Users must be educated as to their necessity or else these policies are hard to implement



# Passwords

- Most convenient (and common) form of protection
  - » What you know vs. what you have/are
- Weakest form of protection because people choose bad passwords
  - » Names, numbers, hobbies, username, ...
  - » ...and you only need a few bad ones to open your entire system



### Viruses

- Almost every major corporation and university has had a virus incident
- Most common distribution mechanisms are via floppy disks, downloads (FTP & Web), and e-mail attachments that are not scanned
- Can do *whatever* the author wants it to do *» What they attack:* disk boot sectors and/or files
  - » *How they act:* stealth, polymorphic, encrypted, macro



## Is the Internet Unsecure? (cont.)

- Philosophy of "experts" differ:
  - » Nefarious people are everywhere! Never send critical data in e-mail or forms
  - » Hackers would prefer to break into a system and steal 20,000 credit cards rather than work so hard to find your credit card
- This might be a good time to read 2600 *Magazine* or *Phrack...*











## **E-Mail Vulnerabilities**

- E-mail is one of the two most widely used applications on the Internet
- Common attacks
  - » E-mail bombing, spoofing, spamming, attacks on *sendmail*
  - » E-mail attachments are not a threat... unless automatically executed
  - » POP's plaintext passwords make it trivial for users to steal e-mail passwords (vs. APOP)



# Cookies and IE5

- If you have disabled cookies, the IE5 install re-enables them
  - » You must re-disable
- IE5 install sets *www.msn.com* as default start page, which immediately sets a cookie
  - » Any site with an existing cookie on your system is allowed to silently reset its cookie even if you have asked to be prompted



### Some UNIX Weaknesses

- Reputation for being unsecure because there are many versions and no unified security mechanisms
  - » ACLs protect file/directory access
  - » Two privilege levels: user and superuser (root)
  - » setuid allows user to spoof another user
  - » Many programs don't check input buffer
  - » Almost every common UNIX daemon has a reported security vulnerability



1 xterm				
513	open	tcp	login	
514	open	tcp	shell	
515	open	tcp	printer	
540	open	tcp	uucp	
Intere	sting port	s on (192.1	68.1.106):	
Port	State	Protocol	Service	
7	open	tcp	echo	
9	open	tcp	discard	
13	open	tcp	dautime	
19	open	tcp	chargen	
21	open	tcp	ftp	
23	open	tcp	telnet	
25	open	tcp	smtp	
37	open	tcp	time	
79	open	tcp	finger	
111	open	tcp	sunrpc	
512	open	tcp	exec	
513	open	tcp	login	
514	open	tcp	shell	
515	open	tcp	printer	
540	open	tcp	uucp	

xterm		
arpski rvnamed	watcher	
ke-ssh-known-hosts scp	z0ne	
ot@localhost_binj# queso_www.insecu	ire₊org	
8.195.109.24:80 *- Firewalled	host/port or network congestion	
oot⊍localhost binj# queso www.whiter	iouse,gov	
3.13/.240.91:80 * Berkeley: Ih	(1X 5.X	
oot⊍localhost binj# queso www.apple.	.com	
oot@localhost bin]# queso -p 22 192. 2.168.1.254:22 * Linux 2.1.xx oot@localhost bin]# queso www.txdire 3.142.64.3:80 * BSDi or IRIX	168,1,254 « ect.net	
ot@localhost bin]# queso www.iss.ne	et	
8.21.0.11:80 * Linux 1.3.xx, 2.0.0	to 2.0.34	
°oot@localnost bin]# queso www.utexas 28.83.40.15:80 * Berkeley: usually Di °oot@localhost bin]# queso -p 21 192.	s.eou Igital Unix, OSF/1 V3.0, HP−UX 10.× 168.1.245	
2.168.1.245:21 * Linux 1.3.x>	c, 2.0.0 to 2.0.34	
oot@localhost bin]# queso localhost		
.0.0.1:80 *- Not Listen, try and	other port	
ot@localhost bin]# queso - <u>p 110 loc</u>	alhost	
.0.0.1:110 * Linux 2.0.35 to 2.0.	.9999 :)	
ot@localbost_bin]# 🗍		

### Windows NT Overview

- Born from MS/IBM split over OS/2
  - » True 32-bit operating system rather than a program running over DOS
  - » Graphical user interface
- Supports client-server applications, as well as peer-to-peer networking
- Provides DoD "C2-level security"

#### NT's C2 Security Mechanisms

- Object Security
- Identification and Authentication
- Access Control
- Auditing









# **Firewall Philosophies**

- The Four Ps:
  - » Paranoid no connection
  - » Prudent "deny all"
  - » Permissive "allow all"
  - » Promiscuous no protection
- Firewalls are a Maginot Line that point out... » ...and most attacks come from the inside!!
- Firewalls *should* also protect against outbound attacks!!



# Private Communication and Transactions on the Internet

- Secure communication requires:
  - » Authentication
  - » Message integrity
  - » Non-repudiation
  - » Privacy/confidentiality
  - » Authorization
  - » Audit





alex:LqAi7Mdyg/HcQ:503:100:Alex Insley:/home/alex:/bin/bash gary:FkJXupRyFqY4s:501:100:Gary Kessler:/home/gary:/bin/bash todd:edGqQUAaGv7g6:506:101:Todd Pritsky:/home/todd:/bin/bash sarah:Jbw6BwE4XoUHo:504:101:Sarah Antone:/home/schedule:/bin/bash josh:FiH0ONcjPutlg:505:101:Joshua Kessler:/home/webroot:/bin/bash







#### **PGP: Signatures**

----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----Hash: SHA1

Hi Carol.

What was that pithy Groucho Marx quote?

/kess

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv

iQA/AwUBNFUdO5WOcz5SFtuEEQJx/ACaAgR97+vvDU6XWELV/GANjAAgBtUAnjG3 Sdfw2JgmZIOLNjFe7jP0Y8/M =jUAU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



## A Few Words About DES...

- DES introduced in 1977
  - » Proposed by IBM with 56- or 128-bit key; NSA adopted 56-bit key
- March 1998, U.S. Gov't. still claims that DES is safe from attack...
  - » July 1998, EFF introduces DES cracker designed for \$220K; can break keys in average 4.5 days
  - » For \$1M, could break DES keys in average <22 hours
- We care because DES is the most widely used crypto scheme in the financial industry!!



## Certificates

- *Certificates* bind a public key to an individual, position, or other entity, and provide
  - » Identification
  - » Date of expiration
  - » Issuing authority
  - » Serial number
  - » Policies about how the user was identified
  - » Limitations on how the key may be used



Edit A Certification Authority - Netscape				
his Certificate belongs to: GTE CyberTrust Global Root GTE CyberTrust Solutions, Inc. GTE Corporation US	This Certificate was issued by: GTE CyberTrust Global Root GTE CyberTrust Solutions, Inc. GTE Corporation US			
erial Number: 01:A5 his Certificate is valid from We ertificate Fingerprint: CA:3D:D3:68:F1:03:5C:D0:32:FA	d Aug 12, 1998 to Mon Aug 13, 2018 :B8:2B:59:E8:5A:DB			
his Certificate belongs to a Certif	ying Authority			
Accept this Certificate Authority	y for Certifying network sites			
Accept this Certificate Authority	y for Certifying e-mail users y for Certifying software developers			
<ul> <li>Accept this Certificate Authority</li> <li>Warn before sending data to sit</li> </ul>	y for Certifying software developers			



# Conclusions

- People won't use security tools that inhibit their ability to work
- Fixed, static network defenses are eventually circumvented
- View your network as an attacker would to understand the true threat
- You have to do the basic stuff and maintain vigilance







#### Acronyms and Abbreviations

